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INTRODUCTION

This Article provides a new theory of tax expenditures. Its
argument is that the decision to implement a "nontax"
program through the "tax system" has little or nothing to do
with tax policy. Instead, the tax expenditure decision, which
we will also call the integration decision or the decision to
combine tax and spending programs, is solely a matter of
institutional design. It is about assigning projects such as tax
collection, education, defense, or housing to specific units of
government. Different groupings of activities will perform
differently, and we should use those groupings that yield the
best possible performance. The problem is similar to the
problem of splitting up a corporation into divisions.
Suppose, for example, that we are considering whether
an education subsidy should be implemented through the tax
system or through a direct expenditure. The government
might use a tax exclusion, deduction, or credit implemented
by the IRS or, alternatively, it might use a direct grant
implemented by the Department of Education.
The two leading theories that purport to address
this question of how to allocate government largesse both
focus on tax policy. The most widely accepted theory, the
comprehensive tax base theory, argues that a broad tax base
distorts economic decisionmaking less than a narrow base
and is also much simpler to administer. To ensure that the tax
base is as broad as possible, this theory suggests that spending
and regulatory programs should not be implemented
through the tax system; instead, they should be assigned to
other agencies or departments. Integrating a spending program
into the tax system, for example through a deduction, exclusion,
or credit for some special activity, narrows the tax base and
makes the tax system more complex. The standard or default
response according to a comprehensive tax base theory,
therefore, is that government spending programs, such as the
education subsidy in our example above, should not be
implemented through the tax system.
The other leading theory, the theory of tax expenditures,
focuses partially on institutional design, but it, too, is
ultimately a theory of taxation. The key insight of this theory is to recognize the functional equivalence of putting a program in the tax system or somewhere else. While this insight
relates to institutional design, the theory ultimately falls back
on tax policy for recommendations. For example, the distributional effects of a policy are said to depend on whether it
is correctly considered part of the tax base. The tax expenditure theory, just like the comprehensive tax base theory,
would conclude that the education subsidy should not be
implemented through the tax system.
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In contrast to these theories, which focus on taxation,
our theory focuses on institutional design-the question of
how the government chooses to compartmentalize its functions.
It is entirely irrelevant whether some piece of government
policy complies with independent tax norms. If the underlying
policy is held constant, there are no effects of putting a
program into or taking a program out of the tax system even
if doing so hurts or enhances traditional notions of tax policy.
Welfare is the same regardless of whether the program is formally
part of the tax system or is located somewhere else in the
government. If we mistakenly look only at the tax system
instead of overall government policy, we will draw the wrong
conclusions. Putting a program into the tax system makes the
tax system look more complicated, but there is unseen
simplification elsewhere. The tax system will seem less efficient,
but the efficiency of government policy is unchanged.
The institutional design question is about dividing the
government into units that will provide the best possible set
of public policies and government services. Different groupings
of government services will perform differently. Consider, for
example, a proposal to have the IRS run the country's defense
system, replacing the Department of Defense. The proposal
is not as silly as it sounds. It would not mean that bespectacled
revenue agents would be parachuting into the Hindu Kush
wearing night goggles, camouflage, and pocket protectors.
Instead, an intelligent Commissioner of Internal Revenue
would allow his employees to specialize. Revenue agents
would specialize in reading financial statements and soldiers
would specialize in fighting. Policies under such a proposal
might very well continue much as they do today. The reason
why the proposal is not a good idea is that there are no benefits
to coordinating these two functions of tax administration
and defense. Moreover, there would be additional costs
because at the very top level, where functions must be
combined, administrators would be unable to specialize in
these relatively distinct functions.
Consider instead a proposal to implement all federal
welfare-type programs through the IRS. Proposals of this sort
have been made frequently, often under the rubric of a negative
income tax. This may make sense, if there are benefits to
putting welfare and tax into the same organizational unit:
Both programs rely on income or wealth measurement, both
need large-scale information and financial processing, and both
have substantive policies, such as the policy of redistribution,
that overlap significantly. The two programs thus might
benefit significantly from coordination by a single agency.
The key variables from this perspective have nothing to
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do with tax policy. Instead, they have to do with the benefits
of coordination between and specialization within various
types of activities performed by the government. The
Department of Defense needs highly specialized operatives,
and thus benefits little from coordination with the revenue
collection function. Welfare programs, on the other hand,
may gain much from coordination with tax collection, and
there may be low costs to losing the utility of separate units
that can specialize in each function. The question is one of
tradeoffs between the benefits of specialization on the one
hand and the benefits of coordination on the other.
This intuition strongly contrasts with the usual tax
arguments. For example, the Flat Tax is an attempt to provide
a comprehensive consumption tax base. All the extraneous,
nontax elements of current tax law would be removed. The
Flat Tax is said to be very simple, and it may be if one looks
only at the tax system. But limiting the tax system to this one
measurement would force other government programs to
take up the slack: Programs of all sorts that are now embedded
in the tax system will have to be implemented by other
government agencies. Viewing the Flat Tax (or any comprehensive
tax base) as simple requires ignoring the rest of government,
relegating the complexity and mess of government spending
and regulation to somebody else's backyard. There is no
reason to believe, however, that the tax collection function
should necessarily be separated from other functions of
government-and there may be good reasons to believe that
it should not be. The same is true for virtually all proposed
fundamental tax reforms.
This Article expands on these intuitions. Part I frames
the question as one of institutional design rather than tax
policy. Part II discusses the comprehensive tax base and tax
expenditures literatures. We argue that neither literature
provides a convincing answer to the question of how government
spending programs should be organized. The comprehensive
tax base argument is the more prevalent of the two, but it
ignores the basic problem of organization: It takes a completely
tax-centric view of government and, therefore, leads to faulty
conclusions. The tax expenditures literature addresses the
problem-at least to some extent-as one of institutional
design, but its analysis is neither complete nor convincing.
Part III approaches the problem from an institutional
design standpoint. The study of organizations is old and
deep, extending into sociology, economics, political science,
and even anthropology and psychology. Covering even a
small portion of this literature is well beyond the scope of one
paper, but the problem can be divided into three more
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manageable pieces. First, we can view organizations as devices
for coordinating specialized functions and, in particular, for
separating production processes into tasks or divisions in the
most efficient manner possible. Second, we can view
organizations as a way to solve agency problems. Third, we
can view the design of public organizations as a method of
resolving public choice problems. The volume of literature in
each of these areas is very large, and the more informal
literature generally mixes these areas together. The portions
that relate directly to the problem of divisions, however, are
reasonably manageable and in some cases quite sparse. In this
Article we address only the first of these three questions-the
specialized production part of the puzzle. We intend to
address the agency and public choice elements of organizational
theory in subsequent work.
The key intuition on specialization of production is that
there are benefits to both specialization in particular activities
and coordination between activities. Putting a set of activities
into a governmental agency promotes specialization within
that set of activities and coordination among the activities.
But at the same time, doing so makes it more difficult to
coordinate between the activities in that agency and the
activities of other agencies. Part III develops this intuition by
surveying the literature in the area of organizational structure.
To demonstrate the worth of these intuitions, Part IV
works through several examples, evaluating government
programs from the standpoint of institutional design. In
particular, it examines two federal programs-the food
stamp program and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)and considers whether either should be implemented as part
of the tax system. There are good reasons to think both
should be: They are both transfer programs based on income,
and the IRS may be the agency that is best able to perform
this income-based redistribution. Nevertheless, we conclude
that the food stamp program may not function as well if it is
made part of the tax system, because the tax system cannot
respond in a sufficiently timely fashion to the needs served by the
food stamp program. The EITC, by contrast, works reasonably
well within the tax system. The difference between the two
programs is the degree to which their functions complement
those performed by the tax system. Part V concludes.
I. FRAMING THE QUESTION
The central question of this Article is how to determine the
best way to implement a government program, given that
such a program is going to be implemented. As Stanley
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Surrey noted in his tax expenditures analysis, virtually any
program can be implemented in at least two ways. It can be
implemented through a direct spending program or through
a tax program. The question is how to make this choice.
For example, suppose that the government wants to provide
an education incentive. The incentive might, for example,
take the form of a voucher program, providing money for
students to use in choosing high schools. Alternatively, the
incentive might try to reduce the cost of saving or borrowing
money to pay for college, as do the recently enacted college
savings plans and income-contingent student loans. In either
case, the grant might be based on attendance at an appropriate
institution, income, citizenship, race, lack of criminal convictions,
grades, or a variety of other attributes.
Such a program can be implemented through an expenditure
program that distributes money to individuals meeting the
criteria. The department implementing the program, say the
Department of Education, would have to create an application
process, a certification or audit process (both for students and
schools), a process for handing out money, and, if appropriate, a
process for collecting payments. Setting up such a program
would be complex and would take significant resources.
Alternatively, a similar program could be implemented
through the tax system by allowing individuals to subtract or
add the same amounts to their taxes (or if their taxes are not
sufficient, by requiring the Department of the Treasury to
write a check to the individual based on a claim made on his
tax form). Similar application, certification, and auditing
requirements could be imposed. The additional requirements
imposed on the tax system would also be significant, making
the tax system much more complex. As a final alternative, the
program could be split between the tax system and another
agency, with each agency providing services related to its
expertise and some coordination between the operations.
Similarly, suppose the government wants to provide welfare
to a subset of the poor. For example, the government may
want to provide welfare to those poor who work a certain
amount. Such a welfare program can be implemented
through the tax system. The EITC does exactly this: It provides
a tax credit for individuals if their labor earnings are within a
certain range, subject to a variety of other criteria (for example,
different credits are granted to the married, the unmarried,
those with and without children, and those with earnings
from sources other than labor). A similar program could also
be implemented outside the tax system, through a direct
grant of aid based on similar criteria.
The question is how we should decide which is the better
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method of implementing these programs in each of their
circumstances. The key is to assume that a program of some
sort will be implemented, so that it is not an option to say
that these are bad ideas and we should do nothing. They may
very well be bad ideas, and actual programs implemented by
the government may be even worse, but unless one is going
to admit no role for the government other than the most
minimal functions, these sorts of programs and problems will
arise. The government will, sometimes for the better and
sometimes for the worse, subsidize, penalize, or regulate various
activities, and we must decide how this should be done.
We need not belabor the importance of the question. As
Surrey-and others before and after-have established, there
are a vast number of programs implemented through the tax
system. Both the executive and Congress make annual
estimates of the size of these expenditures, and the amounts
are large. For example, the Bush Administrations 2004 budget
estimates that in 2003, the exclusion of employer-provided
contributions for medical insurance reduced tax revenues by
$108.5 billion, and the deduction for mortgage interest on
owner-occupied homes cost $65.5 billion. The same budget
lists fourteen different education programs in the tax code.
The EITC is one of the largest welfare programs, having
grown faster than any other program over most of the last
decade. Whether programs such as these should be implemented
through the tax system is thus an important question, and
one that has commanded significant scholarly attention.
There are four important limitations to our framing of
the question. First, we generally will discuss only comparisons
between direct grants and tax subsidies, although a similar
analysis could be applied to regulatory programs. Regulatory
programs can be implemented through tax or expenditure
programs: For example, although we could directly regulate
executive salaries, we instead impose tax penalties for executive
salaries that do not conform to certain requirements.
Similarly, tax and expenditure programs can be implemented
through regulation: The minimum wage, for example, can be
viewed as a combination of a tax and a spending programtaxing employers and providing grants to employees-that
has been implemented through regulations. We are not even
sure that there is a clear dividing line between spending,
regulation, and taxation, and we do not wish to imply that
the analysis of government programs must be limited by any such
taxonomy. Nevertheless, our examples tend to focus on the
comparison between direct grants and taxes, and there may be
differences in the context of regulatory programs that we gloss over.
Second, there are both bureaucratic and legislative
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components to the implementation of any program that
typically (but not always) move in tandem. Putting a
program into the tax system generally (but not always)
involves delegating the program to the IRS and also at least
partially delegating legislative jurisdiction to the tax-writing
committees. Putting the program into another agency generally
involves delegating legislative jurisdiction to the appropriate
oversight committee for that agency.
The interaction between the committee structure, the
legislative floor, the agency, and the President can be very
complex. Problems of legislative organization raise unique
questions because legislatures cannot choose their members
and have a low tolerance for hierarchies. The internal design of a
legislature might, therefore, differ from the stand-alone optimal
design of a bureaucracy. The interaction of legislative design
with oversight requirements may affect bureaucratic design.
To simplify the problem, our focus will generally be on
agencies rather than other political actors. Principal-agent
problems between the legislature and agencies, between the
Executive and agencies, and within the legislature are likely
to be a central piece of the integration issue, but in this
Article we focus only on how to organize specialized production
across potential implementing agencies, ignoring these
principal-agent problems for now.
The third simplification is that we will ignore agency
capture, interest group activity, and other problems of public
choice. Agency capture is in a sense just a variant on the
principal-agent problem, where the agent's preferences
coincide with the preferences of the regulated industry and
do not align with the preferences of the principals. The
difference is that agency capture arises because of problems of
collective action (such as monitoring of the agency by large
groups of individuals). The same is true of many of the public
choice problems that arise with respect to agencies. These
issues have important consequences for the design of agencies;
for example, scholars have considered the use of tax expenditures
as a way to limit capture of congressional committees. While
agency capture and other public choice considerations are
likely to be important in considering whether to put
programs in the tax system, we put the issue to one side.
Fourth, we generally take the limits and boundaries of
current institutions as given. We assume, for example, that
both the tax system and the education system exist as they
are, and that the question is how to implement an educational
program, rather than how to restructure one or both systems
to make them run more efficiently. The framework we set
forth could apply more generally to wholesale reorganizations of
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the government and its agencies, but in our examples, and to
some extent in our thinking, we have confined ourselves to a
smaller goal-namely, to determine how to allocate a
program across existing institutions, treating the merits and
flaws of those institutions as largely fixed.
To summarize, we frame our question as a choice among
implementation methods for a program that is going to be
adopted. The choice involves picking which government
agency or agencies should implement the program, with the
primary focus on whether it should be the tax system or some
other agency. We focus on the organization of production
within the government bureaucracy and the effects of coordination
and specialization-leaving aside questions about the legislature,
principal-agent problems, and agency capture.
II. DO THE COMPREHENSIVE TAx BASE AND TAX
EXPENDITURES LITERATURES ANSWER THE QUESTION?
A. The Comprehensive Tax Base
The goal of comprehensive tax base (CTB) advocates is to
provide a broad tax base that has few or no exceptions,
preferences, or loopholes. CTBs generally come in two
flavors: income CTBs and consumption CTBs. An income
CTB attempts to tax some comprehensive measure of
income, the details of which depend on each advocate's taste
for purity over administrative complexity (or any other
sufficiently important consideration). A consumption CTB
attempts to tax a comprehensive measure of consumption.
The arguments favoring either an income CTB or a
consumption CTB are based on both efficiency and fairness.
The efficiency argument is that a broad tax base is more
neutral between activities than is a narrow base. For example,
the current income tax does not tax owner-occupied homes but
does tax corporate capital. By providing a relative disincentive to
invest in corporate capital over owner-occupied homes, these
differential tax rates change where individuals allocate capital
and, therefore, distort markets. A CTB would be neutral
between investments in owner-occupied homes and corporations,
and would therefore lead to a more efficient allocation of
capital. Moreover, with fewer "leakages" tax rates would be
lower, which would mean that inefficiencies would be further
reduced. The fairness argument is similar: Individuals would
be taxed the same regardless of their preferences for engaging
in different sorts of activities.
The CTB agenda, if followed, almost surely would lead
to substantial improvement in government policy. Many, if
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not most, of the exemptions to the tax base are unwarranted,
and broadening the tax base will often lead to a more
efficient, fairer, and simpler set of policies. We have no quarrel
with much of the agenda of CTB advocates and applaud
much of their work.
The CTB literature, however, has nothing to say about
the question posed here. If we are going to have a program
and the only choice is how it is going to be implemented, the
efficiency and fairness arguments in the CTB literature
completely fail. If we hold the content of the policy fixed, the
efficiency and fairness arguments in the CTB literature
completely fail. If we hold the content of the policy fixed, the
efficiency implications are the same regardless of whether the
tax agency or some other agency implements it. Similarly, the
fairness of the policy is the same regardless of whether the tax
agency or another agency administers it. If one considers a
program that is going to be implemented one way or another,
the conclusions of the CTB literature may be completely
wrong. There is no a priori reason to believe that a broader
tax base is better in such a situation.
It is possible that CTB advocates believe that government
should never subsidize, penalize, or regulate activities.
Broadening the tax base, then, would not cause similar
programs to be implemented elsewhere. Instead, it would
cause them to be eliminated. In many cases this may be desirable
and a good description of the effect of broadening the tax
base. For example, many of the base-broadening provisions
of the 1986 tax reform did not result in the creation of
substitute programs in other agencies. But this view is unlikely
to be either desirable or a good prediction about government
policy in all cases. If we are going to have a program, the
CTB literature simply has nothing to say about where it
should be administered.
As far as we can tell, the only way one can make the
arguments made by CTB advocates is to treat the tax system
as separate from the rest of the government. Under this view,
ensuring the efficiency and fairness of the tax system, taken
alone, should be the goal of tax reformers. This produces the
odd result that removing a program from the tax system and
replacing it with an identical program implemented by
another agency produces an efficiency and fairness gain,
notwithstanding that no behavior has changed and no policy has
been altered. Kyle Logue has called this view "tax-exceptionalism."
Another name might be NIMBY, or Not In My Back Yard.
CTB advocates want their backyard to be clean but don't
seem to care about where else the trash might be put.
Some CTB advocates make a political (as opposed to an
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efficiency or fairness) argument against integrating spending
programs into the tax system. The idea is that one tax loophole
leads to another. As Walter Blum puts it,
There is nothing about the combination of
rate reduction and base broadening which
dictates that all preferential provisions be
eliminated, but there are potent reasons for
leaning over backwards before allowing any
of them to remain in the law... The existence
of any one special dispensation makes it easier
to argue on behalf of others... [A] Spartan
attitude toward defending the integrity of the
base will aid in creating the impression that
the reform plan is intended to improve the
system as a whole, with the chips falling as
they may, and is not calculated to benefit certain
identifiable groups possessing political strength.
This argument, however, is unpersuasive. Shifting
programs from the tax system to other parts of the government
does not change the amount of government largesse. If handing
out goodies to one group makes it difficult to say "no" to
another group, then putting a program in another agency
does little to make it easier.
One possible reason that it may be more difficult to
limit largesse in the tax system may be that tax programs are
less visible than direct spending. This argument is at least on
the right track, in the sense that it compares different ways of
implementing a program. The visibility argument, however,
is not convincing. Between the tax expenditure budget and
the wide variety of articles and books discussing tax breaks,
there is no reason to believe that individuals are not as
well-informed about tax breaks as direct subsidies. In many
cases, it is hard to believe that tax expenditures are less visible
than other government programs. For example, there is little
reason to believe that the home mortgage interest deduction
is less visible than, say, the implicit guarantee the government
provides to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to lower mortgage
costs. It is similarly unclear why tax deductions for brownfields
cleanup would be less visible than any implicit subsidies one
might find in other environmental rules.
Perhaps endowment effects make expenditures through
the tax system less visible than direct expenditures. People
may perceive a reduction in taxes for engaging in a specified
activity differently from an identical direct grant: They may
perceive a tax subsidy as merely letting them keep their
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money, even while they perceive an identical program that
taxes them and gives the money back through programs or
services to be a subsidy. Attempts to publicize the extent of
tax subsidies through budgets or books will not be able to
overcome this flaw in our reasoning ability.
We are not sure of the extent to which such a flaw exists
or is a problem. There does not seem to be a framing effect
among those who study or work with the tax system; lobbyists
and their clients fully understand the benefits of tax credits
or deductions. If there is a framing effect, it can be overcome.
The argument is really that the hoi polloi are too stupid to
understand the equivalence between a tax benefit and direct
spending. But if the argument relies on stupidity, it is hard to
see how the same individuals will understand or even know
about the vast number of direct spending programs, many of
which have very subtle and indirect effects.
For example, it is hard to believe that individuals understand
the subsidies for driving created by federal highway spending
any better than they understand the subsidies for driving created
by tax benefits for oil companies. Both are very complex
programs that only indirectly affect the consumer. Neither
shows up in a form or application that individuals see. Most
individuals probably never think about the huge subsidies
given to their automobiles. To the extent that they do, it is
hard to believe that they understand the direct expenditure
better than the tax expenditure. Psychological problems may
prevent individuals from properly processing information,
but this does not mean that such cognitive biases are
dominant, or even important, in this context. Moreover, it is
not clear in which direction these biases operate.
To the extent we believe the visibility argument, it may
actually lead to a legislative preference for direct spending
over tax programs rather than the other way around. For
example, if a congressman can fight for either tax reductions
or direct spending, and if constituents perceive direct spending
dollars to be greater than equivalent amounts of tax reductions,
then the congressman may prefer direct spending. The
congressman gets more constituent bang for the same
budgetary buck. In addition, direct spending may be socially
preferable for rent-seeking programs, since it will take fewer
direct spending dollars to satisfy the rent seeker who is
subject to framing. Alternatively, lack of visibility may be a
good thing rather than a bad thing. If the program is desirable
but also one that individuals tend to resist (like eating your
vegetables), putting it into the tax system could reduce opposition
by making it invisible due to framing effects. There is no
general theory of psychology and politics implying that the
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comprehensive tax base is either a good or a bad idea.
To summarize, if programs are going to exist, the CTB
literature has nothing to say about where or how they should
be implemented. To be fair to CTB advocates, many of the
base-broadening (and base-shrinking) proposals make sense,
and we do not mean to claim that the literature is not
valuable. But at the same time, CTB theory focuses
exclusively on the tax system, essentially assuming the answer
to the integration question.
B. Tax Expenditures
The tax expenditures literature, although related to the CTB
literature, focuses directly on the integration question. It
offers many potential insights into that question, but it is also
seriously flawed. We break our discussion of tax expenditures
into three parts. First, we briefly review the basic idea of tax
expenditures. We then review the chief criticism of the idea,
the problem of the definition of tax expenditures. Finally, we
discuss the merits of the substantive arguments made by the
literature, concluding that one of the core intuitions has
merit but that most of the details are unconvincing.
The basic idea behind tax expenditures is that any
government program can be implemented through a direct
expenditure or through the tax system. Any time the government
uses the tax system as opposed to a direct spending program,
the government has created what is labeled a "tax expenditure."
The tax expenditures literature, primarily through the
writings of Stanley Surrey, did three things with this insight.
First, it tried to define the notion of tax expenditures. The
core definition is that any deviation from a "normative
income tax" is a tax expenditure. Thus, any deduction, exclusion,
or credit that would not be allowed under some definition of
income is equivalent to a direct expenditure. Second, it
argued that the budget rules as then in effect distorted
the process toward tax expenditures, particularly by hiding
information about the costs of tax expenditures and by
having more lenient procedures for enactment. The goal of
the tax expenditures literature in this regard was to create a
budgetary accounting for tax expenditures that mirrored that
of direct expenditures, thereby reducing the budgetary incentives
to use tax expenditures. Third, the tax expenditures literature
discussed the merits of tax expenditures, generally concluding
that they are an inferior method of implementing policy.
The definition of tax expenditures has been frequently
debated in the literature. A tax expenditure is said to be any
deviation from a "normative" tax base. The normative tax
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base is defined as an amended version of the comprehensive
income tax base, but the particular details vary by individual
tax expert. In the theory of tax expenditures, much rides on
such differences in definition: If a particular deduction or
credit falls within the bounds of the normative tax base, none
of the consequences of being a tax expenditure applies, while
if it falls outside of the normative tax base, all of the
consequences apply.
Bittker is the most prominent critic of this approach. He
argues that a comprehensive definition of income would
include many items not contained in the "normative tax
base" of tax expenditure proponents. For example the tax
expenditure supporters do not include the benefit of the cash
method of accounting, the realization requirement, and
imputed income from assets and housework in their normative
tax base. Moreover, Bittker argues that even among supporters
of a tax expenditure theory, there is no widely accepted
definition of the proper tax base. For example, there is no
broad consensus regarding the acceptable degree of progressivity
or of the scope of a family.
Bittker is not merely accusing tax expenditure theorists
of inconsistency in defining tax expenditures. Instead, he is
accusing them of making implicit policy judgments. If all of
these exceptions from the tax expenditures list are based on
policy judgments, then so are the items on the list. Policy
judgments, however, do not come from definitions. Instead,
Bittker concludes that, short of a coherent conceptual model,
each exemption from the tax base must be examined and
evaluated on its own merits.
Stated in the language we are using here, it is hard to see
how the organization of a bureaucracy should depend on a
definition of income. For example, if we are going to subsidize
medical expenses, whether it is desirable to do so through the
tax system should not depend on whether a medical expense
deduction meets the definition of income. Debates about the
matter seem completely beside the point. Similarly, Surrey's
upside-down subsidy argument, discussed below, only
applies to items not meeting the definition of income. It is
hard to imagine that the distributional effects of a provision
depend on meeting a definition.
Another way to see the problem with the definitional
approach is to consider the integration question with respect
to nontax agencies, as suggested by Professors Douglas Kahn
and Jeffrey Lehman. Suppose, for example, we are trying to
determine whether a conservation program should be put
into the Department of the Interior, the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Army Corps of Engineers, or somewhere
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else in the government. The answer depends on institutional
factors, not on definitions. The same should be true for
deciding whether a spending program should be put into the IRS.
The most heated offshoor of this debate about definitions
is the debate about the scope of the tax expenditure budget.
At the time Surrey was writing, tax programs and direct
spending programs were treated very differently by the budget
system (and they still are). The budget reported the amounts
spent on direct expenditures but did not report amounts
spent through virtually identical programs in the tax system.
The differences in the budget rules were liable to distort outcomes.
To remedy this, Surrey called for a "full accounting" of tax
expenditures, and the result was the tax expenditure budget,
which lists the costs of various items in the tax law.
Some sort of definition of tax expenditures is necessary
to have a tax expenditure budget: We must have some
method of measuring tax expenditures if they are to be
reported in the full accounting. As noted above and
by numerous commentators, however, there is no a priori
definition of the tax system. There is no such thing as a
normative tax base.
The simultaneous need for a definition and the lack of
grounding for any particular definition make the tax expenditure
budget problematic. For example, we must decide whether
accelerated depreciation is a tax expenditure. It provides
faster cost recovery than economic depreciation but slower
cost recovery than expensing. It can alternatively be viewed as
a tax expenditure or a tax penalty depending on whether
one's baseline is an income tax or a consumption tax. Critics
claim that such problems with definitions are fatal to the
exercise of constructing a tax expenditure budget.
Perhaps the reason for the heated debate is the normative
consequences associated with labeling a tax provision as a tax
expenditure. Surrey's arguments, as well as those of the
comprehensive tax base literature, generally condemn tax
expenditures, so such labeling becomes extremely important.
Being put on the tax expenditures list indicates that a provision is
a subsidy or government largesse, while staying off that list
indicates that a provision has the patina of good tax policy.
If we reject the normative consequence of the label, however,
the problem becomes much simpler. The problem is one of
determining what information would be useful. For example,
it would be usefil to know both how much tax revenue would go
up if accelerated depreciation were to be replaced with
straight-line or economic depreciation and how much it would
cost to replace it with expensing. One does not have to answer
the question about which way of looking at the issue is right.
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The decision about what information to release will be
difficult and problematic. It will inevitably have normative
and political components. But it would be a significantly lesser
problem than deciding what to include in the one true tax
expenditures list. For example, information could be presented
in a variety of nonevaluative ways under an "information
usefulness" rationale, whereas there is only one correct (and
strongly evaluative) method to present the same information
under a traditional tax expenditures rationale. Similarly, as
has been suggested by others, information would only need
to be provided for those elements of the tax system that could
conceivably be replaced with a direct expenditure program,
because only these programs can be distorted through budgetary
nonneutrality. Surrey's argument that the budget process
could skew outcomes was correct; we should not let unrelated
problems with his arguments get in the way of this truly
valuable contribution.
Much of the debate about tax expenditures has focused
on these definitional problems. Although Surrey apparently
believed and cared about the definitional parts of his argument,
this focus on definitions distracts from the underlying
substantive arguments surrounding tax expenditures. Once
definitions are put aside, the tax expenditures question really
is the integration question. We believe that many of the
substantive arguments r 'de in the tax expenditures literature
about integration are u convincing, but that there is a core,
unstated intuition that remains valuable.
Surrey's substantive argument is that tax expenditures
are an inferior method of implementing policy. Instead, he
claims, the government should use direct spending programs.
The reason is that tax expenditures tend to have a variety of
features that lead to poor implementation. For example,
Surrey argues that tax expenditures create so-called upside-down
subsidies. Upside-down subsidies are created because the
value of tax deductions increases with the marginal tax rate,
so that wealthy individuals with high marginal tax rates will
receive more for a given deduction than individuals with
lower incomes and lower marginal tax rates. If one views tax
expenditures as equivalent to the government handing out
money, wealthy individuals get bigger handouts than the poor.
Tax expenditures also possess other traits that tend to
make them open to inefficiency or abuse. First, they place no
limits on the amount of tax benefits a taxpayer may receive,
and hence are not capped. Second, because they are part of
the Internal Revenue Code, tax expenditures do not require
an annual appropriation (as agency programs do); rather,
they are like direct expenditures that are automatically
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appropriated absent some contrary congressional action.
Third, tax expenditures tend to have relatively loose eligibility
requirements, in the sense that individuals self-declare their
eligibility and are challenged only if they happen to be audited.
And finally, as Surrey argues, tax expenditures in general
create more complexity than direct expenditures.
The immediate response to such arguments is that we
can overcome these flaws by designing tax expenditures to be
implemented in the same manner as direct expenditures.
Indeed, Surrey begins his argument by assuming that tax
expenditures could be applied in a way that is basically identical
to direct expenditures. If direct and tax expenditures have the
same content, however, these criticisms do not apply. For
example, if a tax expenditure has the same content as a direct
spending program, it will not have the upside-down subsidy
effect, it will not be open-ended, its eligibility criteria will be
the same as those of a direct expenditure, and it will not be
more complex than the direct spending program. Moreover,
many new tax expenditures are designed to be more similar
to direct spending programs than prior tax expenditures
were. Congress now tends to use credits rather than deductions
and has, where it has thought it appropriate, limited the size
of the expenditure or the eligibility for the expenditure.
It is curious that someone as sophisticated as Surrey
would make such an obvious mistake. While Surrey states
that he wants to compare identical tax and direct expenditures,
if he truly did so, his conclusion would have to be that the
two programs are identical. Instead, Surrey concludes that
direct expenditures are superior to tax expenditures. He does
so by comparing different programs, notwithstanding his
assertion that the programs can be made identical. Yet he
does not justify why he compares different programs.
Perhaps Surrey compares different programs merely
because that is what he observed. But we believe that there is
a key, unstated intuition driving him toward this approach:
Institutions matter. If institutions matter, policies will be
different when implemented by different institutions. Thus, tax
expenditures and direct expenditures will tend to have different
features and should not be compared as if they were identical.
For example, the use of exclusions or deductions to
implement tax expenditures may create an upside-down subsidy
effect, but doing so also has an important offsetting feature:
An exclusion is an incredibly simple method of implementing
policy and a deduction is only a little bit more complicated.
Similarly, self-declared eligibility is much simpler than other
methods of implementing policy.
While these features could be made part of a direct
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spending program, they are a key benefit of integration into
the tax system because they take advantage of the existing
infrastructure of tax collection. That is, integration allows for
economies of scope in policy implementation with the resulting
savings in administering and complying with the system. We
would not necessarily want to design tax expenditures to be
the same as direct expenditures. If we did, we would defeat
the purpose behind putting a program into the tax system.
We would lose the benefits of integration.
For example, if we want to subsidize the development of
human capital, we can create direct spending programs that
might subsidize training or education. An alternative is to
defer taxation of the returns to education. Exclusion and
deferral have many flaws, but a key-perhaps decisiveadvantage is that they are incredibly simple. The current system is
transparent to individuals. Integration of the education subsidy
with the tax system achieves this transparency better than a
direct spending education program with identical substance.
One way to frame the choice between tax and direct
spending is to begin with a set of broad policy objectives and
allow complete freedom in designing a program to meet
them. The objectives can be met in a variety of institutional
settings, and we should compare the best possible program
that can be implemented in each of these different settings.
Integration, for example, allows coordination of programs
and the use of a common infrastructure for administering
programs. But in integrating two programs, we might give up
making each of them as accurate as possible with a specialized
agency. We choose the method of implementation that offers
the best results.
Surrey, then, had the key idea right even if it was not
explained: We should not compare identical programs when
making the integration decision. We should compare
programs that are best designed for each institutional
structure and choose the best from among these.
Consider for example, Anne Alstott's discussion of the
integration of welfare programs with the tax system. She
focuses on whether the EITC, which can be viewed as a
substitute for more traditional welfare programs, is a good
idea, but her arguments have broader application.
Integrating welfare and tax systems may greatly simplify
government policy by utilizing the existing institutions of the
federal income tax. But the benefit of a stand-alone welfare
program would be that it could test eligibility and provide
benefits over short periods, in order to account for the fact
that individuals' welfare needs can vary dramatically over
short periods of time. If one uses the institutional structure
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of the tax system to implement a welfare program, one must
almost inevitably use an annual accounting period.
Therefore, one of the tradeoffs of integration is that the
program is less well-tailored to its needs-that is, it will be
less accurate. The tradeoff is between the simplicity benefits
of integration and the accuracy benefits of separation.
Note that this turns the usual complexity/simplicity
argument on its head. The usual argument is that putting
programs into the tax system increases complexity. This argument
is correct if one looks only at the tax system. But if one
considers government policy as a whole, integration with the
tax system may often be a choice for simplicity. Integration is
a choice to take advantage of the infrastructure of the tax
system at the cost of less accuracy in program design than
would be achieved through a separate agency.
Surrey's arguments do not hold up well under this type
of analysis because he does not consider the benefits of the
design features that he observes. For example, the open-endedness
and eligibility declaration criteria that he criticizes greatly
simplify the system. He argues that we do not find these
features in direct expenditure programs, so they must be
undesirable. But whether they are found in direct expenditure
programs is entirely beside the point. The decision to put a
program into the tax system can be seen as a decision that the
accuracy costs of these features are outweighed by the
simplicity benefits of integration for those particular programs.
We should expect to see different features in tax expenditures
and direct expenditures. In fact, we should expect to see different
features in tax expenditures and direct expenditures for
precisely the reason that Surrey provides in comparing
different programs-because design features will and should
vary with the institution implementing the program.
To summarize, the tax expenditures literature focuses on
the integration question and does not take a NIMBY-type
attitude, unlike the CTB literature. It gets confounded in
unnecessary definitional debates, but it provides a key insight:
When comparing methods of implementing policy, we should
not compare identical programs, but instead should compare how
a policy is likely to be implemented in any given institutional
structure. The contribution of this framework is significant,
but the arguments of the tax expenditures literature are
unconvincing precisely because they fail to take full advantage
of this framework. Tax expenditure theory fails to account for the
inherent benefits of integration, and instead focuses on a tax-centric
consideration of complexity. In so doing, tax expenditure theorists
blind themselves to the differences that matter most between
tax and direct expenditures: the simplification that the tax

20

THE

INTEGRATIONoF

TA

AND SPENDING PROGRAMS

system provides on the one hand, and the tailoring and
accuracy that direct spending programs provide on the other.
Il. THE INTEGRATION QUESTION AS
ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY: COORDINATION AND
SPECIALIZATION IN PRODUCTION
We view the integration question as one of how best
to organize the government rather than a question of tax
policy. This means that the relevant place to look is in the
organizational literature rather than in the tax policy literature.
The literature on organizations is vast, going back to Taylor's
scientific management, Weber's studies of bureaucracy,
Coase's theory of the firm, Simon's theory of administrative
organizations, Chandler and Williamson's M and U theories,
Marschak and Radner's theory of teams, and Niskanen's
models of self-serving bureaucrats. It continues today in
modern information processing models, agency models, and
positive political science models.
We address here only a relatively narrow question of
organizational theory. The question we must ask is how we
should optimally split up an organization into divisions.
If one thinks of a hierarchy as an upside-down tree, the
question is the placement of vertical lines that split it into
divisions or agencies. Much of the literature is on the
number of layers or horizontal lines, which is related but not
directly on point. Other portions of the literature on the
nature of leadership within organizations are also not
relevant. Theories of the firm are about boundaries, but the
boundaries are usually between the market and the firm, not
within the firm. It turns out that only a very small portion of
the literature focuses on the issue of optimal divisions within
an organization.
We can break the applicable literature into three parts.
The first part includes theories that assume away any
divergence of preferences among individual agents.
Following Marschak and Radner, we generally refer to this
line of literature as team theory. Hierarchy arises in team theory
because of limitations on information processing.
Hierarchies split up the decisionmaking or information
processing tasks into subunits and allow coordination of
these subunits through higher tiers in the hierarchy. The
shape of the hierarchy usually depends on the gains from
specialization and the costs of coordination. Most of the
team theory literature, however, focuses on the "horizontal"
dimensions of hierarchy, such as the number of layers in a
hierarchy or the span of control for a manager. Our problem is
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how to divide the organization into divisions rather than how
many layers of management it should have. Nevertheless, the
intuitions from the literature about the tradeoff between
specialization and coordination may be applicable.
The second and largest part of the literature focuses on
incentives. This literature assumes agents have some specialized
knowledge that makes delegation attractive and, in addition,
that agents have preferences that diverge from those of their
principals. The goal is to set up a hierarchy that gets the benefit
of organized production (e.g., agents' expertise) while
minimizing shirking. We can think of most tax expenditures
as split delegations, where part of a policy is delegated to a
specialized agency and part to the IRS. For example, much
education policy is administered by the Department of
Education, but some is administered by the IRS. Similarly,
welfare is split between specialized welfare agencies and the
IRS. The integration question thus can be seen as a question
of when the use of multiple agents is desirable.
The last portion of the literature focuses on collective
action or public choice problems. Much of this work is closely
related to the agency literature in that it generally assumes
that a politician or bureaucrat cannot be fully monitored by the
public, but the focus of this branch of inquiry is on the problem
of decisionmaking or monitoring when there are a large
number of diverse principals rather than one or a few principals.
In this Article we focus only on team theory as applied
to the problem of divisions. The question is how we can
organize a bureaucracy to best facilitate specialized production when there is no divergence of preferences between
agencies, the individuals who make up the agencies, and the
legislature or principal. This Part begins by addressing the
problem in a general context and then by turning to how the
analysis applies to bureaucracies and tax expenditures. The
next Part applies the analysis to two examples-Food Stamps
and the EITC.
A. The General Problem of Divisions
There is a tradeoff in deciding whether to assign a function
to a separate division. Separating a function from the rest of
the firm in this manner allows specialization and coordination of
activities within the division, but increases coordination costs
between that division and other activities of the firm. Think
of a hotel company that separates the operation of its luxury
hotels from its value hotels. The separation allows each division
to specialize in providing a particular type of service and to
coordinate those activities cheaply. But the separation means
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that coordination between the divisions will be more
difficult. If coordination among activities is particularly
important-say, because adopting common standards
or operating procedures will save costs-the benefit of
specialization and coordination within an activity may not be
worthwhile. Conversely, the more valuable specialization and
coordination are within a group of activities, and the less
important coordination is among different groups, the more
likely it will be a good idea to separate those groups.
Much has been written on these questions, going back at
least to Adam Smith. Specialization adds value because it
allows an individual or organization to perform the same
activity more rapidly, more accurately, or better in some
other dimension. Smith uses the example of a pin factory. A
single individual can make very few pins in a given time period.
A group of individuals, each specializing in a single aspect of
making pins, can vastly increase output. The reason why is
that specialization in particular elements of pinmaking allows
individuals to perform their particular tasks more efficiently.
The key question is what limits specialization. Why not
have a separate division for each individual function
performed by the firm? The answer, as illustrated by Becker
and Murphy, is that specialization is limited by the costs of
coordination. Too much specialization means that coordination
of the specialized activities becomes difficult. For example,
pediatricians generally do not specialize in particular
childhood diseases. While they would learn more about a disease
through specialization, the additional knowledge would
require greater expenses in coordinating their care with other
pediatricians. The increased costs to individual patients of
dealing with multiple specialists usually would outweigh the
benefit. But we expect to see specialization when the benefit
is sufficient. Thus, for example, we see specialization in certain
very complex and serious childhood diseases such as cancer.
These simple intuitions go a long way. Divisions in a
corporation or agencies in government are like the workers in
the pin factory, specializing in particular tasks but limited in
their specialization by the problem of coordination. Our
problem, however, goes further. We must decide not only
how many groupings to have but also which activities to
group together. For example, even if we knew that a company
should be divided into six divisions, we would still have to
decide which activities are to be put into each division. There
is, to our knowledge, almost no formal literature on this
topic. Instead, the relevant literature dates back to the informal
discussions of organizations from the 1970s and earlier. The
classic works are the historical studies of businesses by
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Chandler and the institutional economics of Williamson.
The key idea is complementarity, which posits that activities that
benefit most from coordination should be grouped together.
Chandler observed that corporations were often originally
organized functionally. Functional organization divides the
firm into departments in charge of specific functions: sales,
production, purchasing, etc. This functional organization
was later termed "U-form," with the U standing for unitary.
The U-form has many advantages. It helps promote
coordination and specialization within the functional areas.
But Chandler observed that as corporations grew, they
discovered several problems with the U-form. One problem
was that central management became overloaded with
decisions about daily operations and coordination of the
functional units, and it could not focus on strategic
decisions. In addition, functional units created agency problems.
Employees tended to concentrate on their functional specialties
at the expense of the overall profitability of the firm. There
was no easy way to monitor employee performance; management
could not accurately determine profitability of functional
subunits because the subunits did not produce a marketable
product on which to base transfer prices.
To resolve these problems, growing corporations tended
to reorganize into a divisional structure, with each division
organized around a product or product line. This form
was later termed the "M-form," with the M standing for
multidivisional. The divisions themselves could be organized
along functional or U-form grounds, so that the firm resembled
a collection of smaller U-form companies.
The M-form was thought to have solved many of
the problems with the U-form. It separated strategic and
operational functions so that management could focus on
broad strategy, and the operational functions could be
coordinated within each division. It also allowed better
monitoring of the performance of managers because divisions
could be measured by profits, unlike functional pieces.
The government is largely organized along the
M-form-that is, by purpose. Congressional committees,
executive branch agencies, and departments are like operating
divisions. Each provides a "product" to the public, such as tax
collection, national security, or education. Like most corporations,
the government is not purely M-form. There are a few functional
elements, such as a common payroll and pension system, but
as a whole, the government resembles an M-form company.
The conclusions from the M-form and U-form literature
get us part of the way to an answer. To the extent the M-form
is better, we should divide an organization along product
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lines rather than by function. But the theory does not tell us
how to determine the extent of a "product line." Instead, it
assumes that there will be some natural or obvious breakdown of
the business into product lines. This, however, is not always
the case. Indeed, the scope of a "product line" is precisely the
core problem of this Article. For example, it is not clear
whether luxury and value hotels are separate products or
whether particular types of services offered by pediatricians
are separate products. And it is not clear whether various
governmental programs should be part of the same "product
line" as taxes.
The idea implicit in the literature is that there should be
a benefit to grouping activities together. The activities must
be complementary. There must be some economy (e.g.,
economies of scope) to combining them. For example,
Chandler quotes an internal memorandum from DuPont,
which was then in the process of reorganization:
"The most efficient results are obtained at
least expense when we coordinate related
effort and segregate unrelated effort. For
example, purchase of materials is unrelated to
the sale of a finished product in a much
greater degree than manufacture and sales, or
manufacture and purchasing; and legal work
is still more unrelated to either of those
before mentioned."
This intuition is nothing more than the realization that
the benefits of coordination of two functions, such as
complementarity in performance, can outweigh the benefits of
keeping them separate, such as economies of scale or expertise.
Williamson, one of the most prominent proponents of
the M-theory, has only a brief discussion of how a company
should set up its divisions. In the end, he offers nothing more
than the intuition from the DuPont memorandum. In an
example, Williamson considers a company that produces five
distinct final products. There are three activity stages to
producing these products-an early production stage, an
intermediate stage in which production is completed, and a
marketing stage. He assumes that all products originate in a
common first stage. From there, four distinct intermediate
stage processes lead to the five distinct final products. This is
represented in Figure 1 [See page 26]. Note that A, and A2 are
the same product, and Vi and V 2 are the same intermediate
production process.
Williamson then discusses how the company should be
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broken down to divisions. First, he separates the initial stage
of production into a division on the theory that at this stage
the economies of scale outweigh the benefits of separate
production within each division. Then, he combines the
intermediate stages and the final stages into a set of divisions on
the theory that there needs to be a high degree of coordination
between these stages. Product A is split into two divisions on
territorial grounds, each combined with an intermediate
stage of production. Next, he assumes that there are
economies of scope for the intermediate stage of products B
and C and, therefore, combines them into a single division
with a single intermediate stage. Finally, products D and E are
assumed to be complements, so they should be marketed
together even though they are produced at the intermediate
stage by separate plants. Therefore, he combines D and E
along with each of their intermediate stages into a single division.
Williamson offers no dear theory for making these decisions.
But his intuitions are similar to those expressed in the
DuPont memorandum. Grouping activities together allows
coordination of the activities but reduces the benefits of
specialization. We want to provide a partition or set of groups
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that best takes advantage of coordination while minimizing
the loss in specialization.
These intuitions can be confirmed in a variety of common
contexts. Consider how doctors design specialties. Doctors
may specialize in eyes, in feet, or in cancers, but they rarely
combine these specialties. It is common, however, for doctors
to combine the knowledge of ears, nose, and throat problems
into a single practice. How can we explain this? Specializing
only in eyes allows doctors to gain the benefits of specialization
and coordination of knowledge about eyes with few of the
problems of coordinating with other medical knowledge.
Specializing in both eyes and feet seems ridiculous because
there are few benefits to coordinating these activities or having
specialized knowledge in both. But it makes sense to combine
ears, nose, and throat practices because they are important to
coordinate-problems in one area may be related to problems in
other areas. These breakdowns in practice areas, which seem
perfectly natural to us, reflect the basic logic of coordination
and specialization.
The same is true within businesses. Recall from the hotel
example that separation of luxury hotels into a separate
division allows specialization in providing luxury hotels and
coordination of those types of activities. At the same time, it
makes coordination of luxury hotels and value hotels more
difficult. The tradeoff is whether the benefits from specialization
and coordination within the luxury hotel market are greater
than the costs of coordination with other parts of the
company's business.
To summarize, the basic tradeoff is an old one between
specialization and coordination. Creating more divisions
promotes specialization and coordination within divisions
but increases coordination costs between them. In deciding
how to place tasks within a division or how many divisions
to divide a task among, we have to look at the benefits of the
various groupings given these costs; the result is that we
should group complementary functions together.
B. Departmentalizationin a Governmental Context
The departmentalization literature largely focuses on the
organization of entities competing in the market. Our
problem is slightly different: We want to determine the best
organization of a government bureaucracy that is producing
and administering policy. This Section develops intuitions about
the organization of bureaucracies. As in the market context,
the intuitions are based on the benefits of specialization and
coordination when different groupings of activities are applied.
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The key difference between government and market
contexts is that there is no obvious measure to determine
how well the government is doing (unlike, say, profits or
stock price in the market context). Ultimately, we should
measure government output in terms of how well the government
produces and implements policy. There is, however, no
uniformly agreed-upon metric for measuring the effectiveness
of government policy.
Because our question is about bureaucratic organization,
we can assume that the basic policy that we are considering
is fixed, having been set by the principal (the executive or the
legislature). We can then measure how well the bureaucracy
implements that policy by measuring how accurate the
implementation is for a given cost. A more accurate policy
better distinguishes between different individuals or different
actions. It comes closer to the optimum. Accuracy, however,
is expensive, which means that no policy will be implemented
with perfect accuracy.
There are a number of prior works that discuss the
tradeoff between accuracy and the costs of producing accuracy,
commonly labeled complexity. For our purposes, we can simply
think of the problem as trading off marginal benefits and
marginal costs. For example, a single speed limit for all roads
would be highly inaccurate. We can increase accuracy by
posting separate speed limits for different roads, although
this increases costs. We could make the speed limit policy
more accurate by posting different speed limits for individual
roads under various weather and traffic conditions, but this
would further increase costs. At some point, the marginal
cost is not worth the marginal benefit of the increase in accuracy.
This approach, however, considers only the costs and
benefits of different levels of accuracy within a given institution.
The issue presented here is slightly different-namely, the
assignment of policies across different agencies. Because the
costs of producing accurate policy will vary with institutional
structure, the independent variable is not how much accuracy
to produce given some cost of production. Instead, the
independent variable is the institutional structure itself, which
then determines the tradeoff between accuracy and complexity.
Given this setup, the analysis works basically the same way
that it does in the private sector. Grouping activities together
allows coordination of those activities but reduces coordination of
those activities with others. Smaller groupings allow more
specialization; larger groupings, more coordination. The key is to
group activities that are related-that is, there are large benefits
to coordination and low costs to the loss of specialization.
For example, consider the IRS and the Department of
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Agriculture. The IRS can presumably measure income at a
given level of accuracy better than the Department of
Agriculture, because of specialization by the IRS in income
measurement. Similarly, the Department of Agriculture can
presumably best measure items related to agriculture, such as
the value of various farming techniques or the safety of various
methods of preparing food. Separating these activities allows
this specialization, but also creates coordination problems.
While the lack of coordination between these activities will
look like bad policymaking, it may in fact be optimal: Setting
up the bureaucracy in a way that instead coordinated the
activities of the USDA and the IRS would reduce the benefit of
each of these agencies specializing in its own activities.
Analyses that look only at one aspect of the problem
rather than overall government policy can be faulty. For
example, Victor Thuronyi notes:
The dairy farmer subsidies include accelerated
depreciation deductions on livestock and
equipment and the acceptance of "cash
accounting," both of which defer tax liability
with no interest. While these tax provisions
subsidize production and encourage herd
expansion, the Department of Agriculture,
on the other hand, pays dairy farmers to
curtail production and slaughter their herds.
Thuronyi presents this clash of policies as if it is necessarily
a bad idea. It may, however, be the result of the best possible
choice of organizational form. The IRS might be the best
agency for providing investment subsidies, and the
Department of Agriculture is probably the best agency for
regulating farmers. Certainly, neither agency would seem to
be best at doing both activities. Therefore separate agencies
for each function, and the resulting lack of coordination,
could be optimal. Any other organizational form, including
one that coordinated these conflicting policies, might be
worse. It is not that we should applaud the end result as
directly desirable; indeed, this particular example may be the
result of a failing of process or design rather than a result of
optimal organizational structure. We need to recognize, however,
that desirable separation of functions into divisions is going to
lead to lack of coordination. An organizational form that produces
better coordination may very well be inferior on other
grounds and, therefore, the lack of coordination may be optimal.
This analysis flips the usual complaint about tax expenditures
on its head. Many claim that tax expenditures increase
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the complexity of the tax system. Under the analysis here,
however, a decision to have separate tax and spending
programs is a decision to have specialization in each program,
presumably with more accurate and detailed measurements
within each program-i.e., greater complexity. A decision to
consolidate spending programs into the tax system, by contrast,
is a decision to coordinate the programs with less fine-tuned
accuracy in each program. Therefore, putting a program into
the tax system can be seen as a decision for simplicity.
To see this, consider another example. Suppose we are
considering whether parts of the welfare system should be
integrated into the tax system, as the EITC is. We must compare
the benefits of having two programs and two administrative
agencies (a special agency to administer the welfare part of
fiscal policy and the tax agency to administer the tax part) to the
benefits of having a single agency administering both programs.
If we have separate programs, each program can be more
easily tailored to meet its specific goals. For example, if it is
desirable to have monthly accounting periods for welfare and
annual accounting periods for tax, each program can adopt
the desired period. Similarly, if the welfare system requires
one measurement of "need" and the tax system optimally
uses a different measurement of "ability to pay," each
program can adopt the required definition. Separation may
enable administrative specialization in the specific requirements
of each policy, and hence improve its accuracy.
The disadvantage of separate agencies is that the various
welfare programs and the tax system may not be coordinated
very well. For example, welfare programs typically contain
phase-outs, which act as a marginal tax on income. Failing to
coordinate these phase-outs can lead to very high effective
marginal rates and a marginal rate structure that seems random.
In addition, each welfare program might use its own
eligibility test, which would mean that individuals would end
up providing similar but slightly different information to
various government agencies. For example, the same child
might qualify as a family member under one program but
not under another, or various elements of income might be
included in one program but not in another, creating
enormous complexity for individuals.
We can generalize this example. Which integrated transfer
programs are likely to be successful? Programs where the
coordination benefits between the tax system and the other
program are high and the specialization benefits of separate
programs are low. Thus, we want to integrate programs that
have close complementarities with the tax system-e.g.,
programs that measure along similar margins. This is why
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welfare and tax are such an obvious pairing. They measure
along very similar boundaries.
One scholar, Eric Toder, recently provided a list of
the features that make a program a good or bad fit for
administration by the IRS. Several items on this list relate to
budgetary aspects of the problem, which we do not deal with
here. Most of the remaining items relate to the benefits of
coordination and specialization and can be explained by our
framework. For example, Toder argues that if the agency has
a high degree of discretion in setting policies, implementing
the program through the tax system may be unwise. The reason
must be that if the agency has discretion, it will be using
expertise to make determinations, which means that the
value of specialization is high. Toder also argues that the
more that the spending program uses tax return data for
eligibility, the more desirable integration is. This easily fits
within our framework-the IRS has expertise in measuring
along those margins, and it exhibits economies of scope in
such measurement. Toder argues that programs that have
open-ended eligibility are better suited to the tax system than
other programs. The reason is that the tax system uses
end-of-year filing, so that programs requiring up-front
eligibility testing would need specialization that would not
be complementary with that of the IRS. Toder's suggestions
seem eminently sensible within our framework.
The problem with these intuitions is that the terms are
extremely vague and are at a very high level of generality.
Translating these terms into measurable formula for making
decisions is far from an easy task. But relatively crude ideas
about accuracy, complexity, specialization, and coordination
can help policymakers muddle through the problems they
face. To see this, in the next Part we go through two
examples in detail.
IV. APPLICATIONS: THE EARNED INCOME TAx CREDIT
AND THE FOOD STAMP PROGRAM

This Part applies the framework developed above to two
major welfare programs-the Earned Income Tax Credit and
the food stamp program (FSP). The welfare system is of
special interest in the analysis of the integration question. In
1998, about $400 billion was spent on more than eighty
means-tested programs in the United States. Total spending
on cash and in-kind welfare benefits was more than five times
higher in 1998 than in 1968 (adjusted for inflation), while
the U.S. population increased 35% during the same period.
The share of the federal budget used for means-tested
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programs rose from 6.4% in 1968 to 16.8% in 1998. In
addition, the composition of tax expenditures changed
significantly over the last two decades of the twentieth century.
Social tax expenditures as a percentage of GDP increased
over 40% during this period while business tax expenditures
were cut in half. Social tax expenditures accounted for 79%
of all tax expenditures in 1999, compared to 57% in 1980.
These trends underscore the importance and relevance of the
integration problem to welfare reform.
We choose to compare the EITC to the FSP for three
reasons. First, the programs are to some extent similar, yet
one is integrated into the tax system and one is not.
Comparison of the performance of the two programs gives us
some sense of the costs and benefits of integration.
Second, plausible cases can be made for integrating both
programs with the tax system primarily because their eligibility
criteria are income-based. In addition, there are serious problems
with integrating each of the programs with the tax system.
Therefore, they make for interesting programs to study.
Finally, these two programs are among the largest
welfare programs in the United States. Accordingly (and
perhaps also for the other two reasons discussed above), there
have been a large number of studies on the delivery of these
sorts of benefits through the tax system, so rather than building
from scratch, we can analyze the conclusions of these studies
within our framework. Much of the earlier work on combining
tax and transfer systems concerned the negative income tax,
with the basic claim being that benefits can be distributed
more efficiently through the tax system. We agree with the

idea that some benefits can best be distributed through the
tax system and, in particular, believe that provision of the
EITC through the tax system makes sense. But we argue,
contrary to the thrust of the negative income tax literature,
that some welfare policies are best implemented separately
because of institutional considerations.
Our analysis follows in part Anne Alstott's work on the
EITC. She is critical of arguments in favor of integrating tax
and transfer systems, arguing that the tax system cannot
adequately perform many functions of the transfer system.
For example, she argues that the tax system cannot respond
as quickly to emergencies as the transfer system. Alstott's
arguments can be analyzed within our framework and are
largely consistent with it. Our conclusions in many places are
different from hers, but to a great extent the particular
conclusions are less important than the mode of analysis.
Therefore, we use her work as a focus of our discussion.
We begin with background information on each of the
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programs and discuss the reasons for integrating the tax and
transfer systems. We then turn to the details of each program
and conclude with a brief discussion of negative income taxes
more generally.
A. Background
The FSP is an in-kind transfer program jointly administered
by the USDA and state agencies. It provides food assistance
to families and individuals based on monthly income, assets,
and family structure. Monthly income is effectively equivalent to
cash income, subject to several exemptions and deductions.
To qualify for the FSP, the applicant's monthly income must
be below a threshold that varies with family size and composition.
Household assets typically cannot exceed $2000, excluding
certain assets (e.g., a house and lot, vehicles of specific use or
of limited value, and most retirement pension plans). Benefit
levels vary according to family size and composition, such as
whether a family member is elderly or disabled; they are
calculated by taking the maximum benefit for a household of
a given size and composition and subtracting thirty percent
of its net income, effectively imposing a thirty percent tax
rate on beneficiaries.
Eligibility for food stamps is determined in advance. To
apply for benefits, food stamp applicants must visit a state
office in person during regular business hours. Applicants
must fill out a detailed and often lengthy application and
provide supporting documentation. Over forty percent of
food stamp applicants make two or more trips to the state
office to complete the initial application process. Eligibility
must be recertified throughout the year, often on a monthly
basis and often requiring return visits to the state offices.
The EITC is a wage subsidy implemented as a refundable
tax credit. As wages rise to specified levels, the credit increases,
eventually plateaus, and then phases out. The levels of the
phase-ins and phase-outs depend on family size, with larger
families generally receiving more generous benefits.
Participants claim eligibility on their tax return without any
prior certification process. Participants are, however, subject
to ex post audits through both data matching and other
auditing techniques. Typically, benefits are paid once a year
after the individual files a tax return. To the extent the credit
offsets taxes otherwise due, individuals can adjust their wage
withholding to get some of the benefits during the year. In
addition, the credit can be obtained during the year through
an advance payment system, although, as discussed below,
this option is rarely used.
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The argument for the integration of transfer programs
such as the EITC and the FSP into the tax system is that
integration enhances administrative efficiency by reducing
bureaucratic costs and complexity. In the language of the
framework proposed here, there are benefits to specialization
and to coordination from integration.
The benefits to coordination arise because the FSP and
the EITC (and, for that matter, virtually all means-tested
welfare programs) rely on similar criteria, such as income.
The IRS is specialized in measuring these criteria and is
therefore likely to be able to take these measurements more
accurately and more cheaply than other agencies, such as the
USDA. In addition, as a form of coordination, integration
would save the costs of processing the same or similar
information more than once by making use of a single
preexisting measurement system. Integration would also
confer savings on recipients, eliminating the need to fill out
multiple forms and visit multiple government offices.
Further benefits to coordination arise through the
interaction of tax and transfer programs on a variety of
margins. For example, phase-outs of means-tested programs
increase effective marginal tax rates, and failure to coordinate
phase-outs can create extremely high rates for low-income
individuals. Similarly, the amount of benefits for any
program should depend on amounts provided by other
programs. A family receiving the EITC might, as a result,
have less need for food stamps or vice versa. Definitions of
marriage and family also need to be coordinated. Both the
tax law and welfare programs can create marriage penalties or
bonuses. Coordination of these programs to limit the effects
on marriage may therefore be important.
Empirical evidence on the accuracy and complexity
of the EITC and the FSP further support the argument for
integration. Subject to data and conceptual limitations, the
key facts are that the FSP costs more to implement than the
EITC by an order of magnitude, but the FSP is not any more
accurate than the EITC (although it produces a very different
pattern of errors).
In particular, annual administrative costs of the FSP are
estimated to be about $4 billion per year. Individual compliance
costs are also likely to be high because of the certification,
recertification, and reporting requirements. There are no
firm estimates for the administrative costs of implementing
the EITC because the IRS does not separately account for the
cost of administering the program. About ninety-five percent
of EITC claimants would file tax returns even if not eligible
for the EITC, which means that the IRS would process most
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of the information and individuals would incur the cost of
filing returns anyway. Individuals must file an extra form
with their return to claim the EITC, which increases their
costs somewhat. The EITC also creates additional audits,
which impose costs on both the government and individuals.
In light of these facts, estimates have put the administrative
costs of the EITC at about $320 million, or less than
one-tenth the amount spent on the FSP. Even at this lower
cost, the EITC is substantially larger than the FSP
Notwithstanding the vastly higher administrative and
compliance costs of the FSP, it is not clear that it is any more
accurate. The FSP has a lower error rate than the EITC, but
also a much lower participation rate. EITC overpayments are
around 27%, while FSP overpayments are around 7%.
Underpayment rates are similar between the two programs:
EITC underpayments are below 2.5%, and the FSP's are
around 2.9%. On the other hand, the EITC participation
rate is about 89%, while FSP participation is around 70%.
Combining each program's underparticipation rate with its
underpayment rate to determine an overall underprovision
rate, we get the following picture:
TABLE

EITC

FSP

1.

COMPARISON OF THE

EITC AND FSP

Underprovision

Overprovision

13.5%

27%

59.5%

33%

7

56%

(e

ua

ihts)

Note The aggregate accuracy measure of the FSP also includes a 4% inaccuaracy due
to food stamp trafficking.

We may not weigh these types of errors equally, so we
cannot say for certain how these numbers compare, but we
see no overwhelming reason why the FSP error rate should be
preferable (and we argue below that in fact the EITC error
rate is actually preferable). Indeed, both the USDA and the
GAO, in analyzing the FSP, weight the two types of errors
equally. Therefore, when accuracy is measured based on
under-and overprovision, the FSP while generating a different
type of error than the EITC, cannot be said to be more
accurate than the EITC, even though it costs ten times as
much to administer and is only one-half the size.
The question posed is whether a change in institutional
structure can improve the performance of either the EITC or
the FSP. The argument here is similar to that invoked to
support a negative income tax: The idea is that a single
approach to need or to well-being should be used in the tax
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and transfer system. A consistent methodology makes sense
from a policy perspective-need is need, and there is no reason
to change the approach when a tax goes from positive to
negative. There is nothing special about zero. In addition,
there are great institutional advantages to a single system,
such as the savings of administrative and compliance costs.
The concern, addressed in the next Section, is that integration
would undermine the benefits of specialization that come
from addressing the particular administrative problems
presented by food stamps.
B. Food Stamps
Given these reasons for integrating the FSP into the tax
system, one might think that the answer is clear. There are,
however, a number of aspects of the FSP that are not
complementary to the tax system. Integration might involve
compromises to these aspects of program design.
There are four areas of concern, three of them found in
Alstott's discussion of the EITC, and a fourth not applicable
to the EITC, and therefore not discussed by Alstott. First,
there are important differences in eligibility measurements
and criteria between the tax system and the FSP. Arguably, an
ideal transfer system might use different measurements from
an ideal tax system. If the systems were integrated, they
would use a single set of criteria, so that integrating the two
would involve a loss of accuracy. Second, the pattern of errors
between compliance and participation is different in the two
systems. Integrating the FSP into the tax system would
likely substitute the tax pattern of errors for the FSP pattern
of errors. Third, the tax system tends to use long measurement
periods to measure permanent changes in well-being, while
welfare systems use short prospective measurement periods to
be responsive to temporary changes in circumstances. The
fourth concern, not mentioned by Alstott because she focuses on
the EITC, is that food stamps are provided in-kind while the tax
system is specialized in collecting and distributing cash.
We review these considerations below, showing how
they relate to issues of specialization and coordination, and
how they fit within the general framework discussed above.
Each of these potential areas of concern can be seen as a
problem of accuracy. The question is whether a specialized
food stamp program is necessary to provide that accuracy or
whether coordination with the tax system and the use of the
tax system's resources-which are specialized to handle
income measurement-is superior. Our conclusions differ
somewhat from Alstott's conclusion regarding similar issues
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with respect to the EITC. In particular, we conclude that
only the responsiveness problem-the problem of measurement
periods-presents an obstacle to integration of food stamps
into the tax system. The data on responsiveness are mixed,
and we are uncertain of what the costs to responsiveness from
integration would be, but there is at least a significant chance
that the responsiveness problem is sufficiently serious to
merit caution in integrating the programs. We do not want
to put too much stress on these differences, however. Instead,
our goal is to show how the analysis fits directly into the
institutional framework we posed above.
1. Measurement Criteria

On the surface, the tax system and the FSP (as well as almost
all means-tested transfer programs) use similar eligibility
criteria-usually income, assets, and family composition
(including whether a family member has a special status,
such as disability or advanced age). This commonality is the
primary reason that integration of welfare policy seems
potentially attractive. Nevertheless, as Alstott notes, there are
important differences.
In particular, Alstott argues that the income tax system
tends to use a less accurate measurement of income and other
resources than traditional transfer programs. Most transfer
programs attempt to measure all sources of cash available to
meet the living expenses of a family, with limited deductions.
For example, the eligibility criteria for food stamps look to all
cash income, allowing deductions (other than standard

deductions and a fixed deduction against earned income)
mainly for dependent care, medical expenses, and excess shelter
costs. The tax system, however, excludes many sources of
wealth, such as retirement benefits and interest on state and
local bonds.
Transfer programs also tend to measure the value of
recipients' assets, which is not generally done in the tax system.
Thus, food stamps limit eligibility to families with less than
$2000 in certain assets, with some adjustments for vehicles.
By contrast, the EITC does not have an asset or wealth test.
The definition of a family is likewise more nuanced
under welfare programs than under the tax system. Current
tax law has a very narrow definition of family, generally treating
even children in the same household as separate taxpayers.
Income transfer programs, in contrast, adopt a broader
definition of family that includes most individuals who live
together. For example, the FSP defines a household as a
group of people who live together and customarily purchase
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food and prepare meals together.
Adopting these tax definitions might create problems for
a transfer system. As Alstott notes, in the 196 0s and 1970s,
when the negative income tax was receiving serious academic
attention, scholars argued that the income definition in the
tax law was inadequate for transfer programs. The tax system's
measurement of income is sufficiently crude that some families
have received the EITC even though their incomes, if measured
using a comprehensive base, could be as much as $ 75,000.
This conclusion argues against integration. One of the
main advantages to integrating transfer programs such as the
FSP into the tax system is to use common definitions and
infrastructure. In our framework, integration can take advantage
of the specialized income measurement resources of the tax
system and gain the benefits of coordination with the tax system.
But using tax definitions might result in a significant loss of
accuracy for the FSP.
There are several responses to these arguments. First,
it is not clear why transfer systems and the tax system use
different definitions. Alstott merely observes that they do and
argues that integration would involve a compromise of
current practices. But to determine the social cost of such a
change, we need to understand why the different programs
use different definitions in the first place. There is nothing
special about welfare programs that should make us want to
use different definitions: It is not clear why we should care
more about accuracy when giving very small sums as transfers to
a poor individual than when taking thousands or millions in
taxes from a very wealthy individual.
Second, assuming that the tax system is inaccurate, we
must weigh the value of accuracy against its cost. If the
savings from integration are substantial, it may be worth the
loss in accuracy. Merely noting that there might be a loss in
accuracy is insufficient.
Third, even if transfer programs use more accurate
definitions of income, they are unlikely to be very good at
measurement. In fact, notwithstanding attempts to measure
well-being carefully in the FSP, about half of all FSP payment
errors are due to an incorrect determination of the household's
income. The tax system, on the other hand, specializes in
income measurement and has invested billions of dollars in
this expertise, including in computer systems that can match
income reports and in agents trained to ferret out fraud.
There are, of course, substantial mismeasurements by the tax
system, but our guess is that for any given measure of
income, the specialization of the tax system is likely to result
in better measurement per dollar spent. It is not clear that the
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attempt at higher accuracy in transfer systems such as the
FSP actually succeeds.
Finally, even if different definitions of well-being are
necessary for food stamps and taxes, the IRS might still be
best at measuring along those margins. That is, merely
because we are going to have the complexity of different
definitions of well-being for different programs does not
mean that integration does not make sense. For example, the
FSP measures wealth to determine eligibility while the EITC
does not. Under FSP rules, however, the wealth measurement
is largely limited to cash-like assets. These assets-with a
clear market value-can be easily measured by the tax
system. The IRS might therefore be the best agency to measure
each criterion; all that would be required would be to alter
the definitions of the tax system to achieve an acceptable level
of accuracy. The problem of different measurement criteria is
thus not a good argument against integrating the FSP into
the tax system.
2. Error Patterns
As noted, food stamps have a low participation rate but also
a low overpayment rate. Both facts are likely attributable to
the eligibility process. Precertification is very costly for
low-income individuals, which discourages FSP applicants
but at the same time weeds out false claims. The EITC has a
high participation rate but also a high overpayment rate.
These facts are likely due to the lack of a precertification
process. Individuals need merely to file a tax return to claim
the EITC. Most individuals claiming the EITC must file a
return anyway, so the additional cost of claiming the EITC is
relatively low.
Alstot refers to this pattern of errors as a tradeoff
between participation and compliance. The FSP chooses to
have a high compliance rate at the cost of a low participation rate
while the EITC opts for a high participation rate at the cost
of a low compliance rate. Given that information is costly, such a
tradeoff between participation and compliance seems inevitable.
Alstott takes the existing pattern of welfare programs
such as the FSP (low participation, low overpayment) to be
desirable. We are not sure we would agree. It is not at all
obvious, in light of the tradeoff, which pattern is preferable.
As noted above, both the GAO and the USDA weight under-and
overpayments equally.
Although there is no general theory on how to balance
under-and overpayments, we can identify three relevant
factors. First, how we choose the balance may depend on
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which individuals fail to receive payments for which they are
eligible and which individuals get overpayments. For example,
Liebman examines which individuals get EITC overpayments
and finds that many overpayments go to families that are
quite similar to eligible families. Ineligibility often results
from a failure to meet one or more minor requirements
rather than because overall income is too high. In such cases,
we may not be concerned by overpayments.
Second, overpayments require higher tax rates, leading
to excess burden. We would need to know the marginal cost
of funds to determine the size of this effect. Finally, for any
given belief about the tradeoff between overpayments and
underpayments, we must examine the administrative cost of
reaching the desired balance between the two. It will generally be
administratively cheaper to have more overpayments but full
participation than to prevent overpayments at the cost of less
participation. The reason is simple: It takes resources to
prevent overpayments.
While the tradeoff between these factors may be
complex, if we examine the actual numbers the FSP pattern
does not look attractive compared to the EITC pattern, given
almost any imaginable views on how to balance these factors.
In particular, Janet Holtzblatt reports that if we add overpayments
and administrative costs together, the EITC and the FSP
both incur costs of about 25 cents on the dollar. This means
that, as compared to the EITC (and by extension, the FSP if
it were administered through the tax system), it costs the
current FSP a dollar of administrative costs to prevent a
dollar of overpayments. This cannot be justified. For example,
suppose that a welfare program has 100 truly eligible recipients
who each receive $ 1, and that the tax system creates no
administrative costs but has overpayments of 25 cents on the
dollar while the FSP has 25 cents on the dollar of administrative
costs and no overpayments. The cost of both the FSP and the
tax system would be $125. It is hard to imagine that we
would want to essentially throw away the $25 on administrative
costs rather than transfer it to individuals.
Moreover, these numbers may significantly understate
the problem. Holtzblatt's study, from which these figures are
derived, does not consider compliance costs of participants:
As a society, we thus spend more than a dollar to prevent a
dollar of overpayments. Holtzblatt also does not consider the
social costs of FSP underprovision due to nonparticipation.
Once these two additional costs are factored in, the price of
preventing overpayments for the FSP seems exorbitant.
Finally, factor in the data showing that overpayments under
the EITC would go to families that are similar to eligible
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families. If overpayments under an integrated FSP were similar,
there would seem to be no argument for the FSP pattern of
errors. Therefore we can conclude that the pattern of
errors for the EITC is preferable. The error pattern argument
supports integration.
3. In-Kind Provision of Benefits
The FSP provides benefits in-kind through a voucher-type
system. The government does not directly provide food to
individuals on food stamps, unlike, say, those receiving
subsidized school lunches. Instead, the government provides
individuals with coupons (typically in the form of an
electronic card) that can be used only to purchase food at
USDA-certified establishments. Authorized retailers must fill
out an application showing that they meet the requirements
and personally go through a training session. Integrating the
FSP into the tax system would probably involve eliminating
this in-kind delivery, because the tax system could not easily
engage in this certification.
The rationale for in-kind transfers has been subject to
extensive study. While the merits of such transfers have been
considered in detail, arguments made in these studies might
not apply to transfers of food (as opposed to insurance or
durable goods). Fortunately, we need not delve into that
literature here. The reason why is that the typical food stamp
benefit is less than the monthly food budget for most
beneficiaries, and is only slightly restricted in its approved
food items. In theory, therefore, the program's decision to
provide in-kind benefits or cash assistance should have no
effect for these beneficiaries; the entire food stamp amount
will be spent on food either way. This prediction is generally
borne out by observed evidence, although there are small and
persistent deviations. The reasons for such deviations are not
fully understood.
Although some may value the increase (if any) in food
consumption due to in-kind provision, it is doubtful that any
such benefit is worth the cost. If we measure nutritional
outcomes as opposed to food intake, we cannot say, based on
available evidence, that providing cash assistance rather than
food stamps would have any effect. And it is nutrition, not
caloric intake, that we should be concerned about with a
food program: As the Food Stamp Act itself declares, food
stamps are aimed at "raising levels of nutrition among
low-income households."
"Cashing out" food stamps would also save administrative
and compliance costs above and beyond the immediate
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savings from integrating food stamps into the tax system. An
individual wanting to use the value of food stamps for something
other than food has an incentive to sell them for cash. This
means that the FSP must spend resources to monitor and
enforce the use of food stamps, and that individuals (and
food retailers) will incur costs to comply with the food stamp
police. Some of the costs of enforcement have gone down in
recent years with the switch to electronic benefits, which are
harder to trade, but the problem is still significant.
Finally, European welfare systems do not have specific
food transfer programs. There is no evidence that their
absence leads to systematic effects on food security or nutrition.
One argument against cashing out food stamps through
integration with the tax system is that it would be too big a
change in the purposes of the program. Cashing out the FSP
would be like eliminating it and increasing the EITC or
TANF by a comparable amount. The argument of this
Article is that we should compare institutional performance
in meeting previously defined goals. The goal of food stamps
might be defined as improving nutrition among the very
poor, in which case cashing out would seem to have little
effect on the achievement of such a goal. But the FSP's goal
might also be to provide food to the poor. It is not clear why
we would opt for a goal of providing food over providing
nutrition, but the integration decision must take as given the
basic policy goals of the program, and it is not inconceivable
that providing food itself is the goal. If so, integration should
not change those goals.
Providing food itself (rather than money to be used for
food) is obviously not complementary to the services provided
by the tax system, which is why we assumed that integrating
food stamps into the tax system would mean cashing them
out. If the FSP provided food itself rather than vouchers for
food, integration with the tax system would probably be
completely infeasible. For example, it is hard to imagine the
tax system directly providing school lunches. But the FSP
uses a voucher system combined with a system for certifying
food providers. This structure might be susceptible to a
hybrid system in which the tax system provides credits or
other benefits for expenditures on food at authorized
establishments. A separate agency that has expertise in certifying
and monitoring food providers (such as the USDA) could
perform the certification function. The Hope and Lifetime
Learning tax credits, for example, work exactly this way.
Such a hybrid system may not be easy to implement.
Individuals would have to keep receipts to prove their
expenditures, fraud would be common, and coordinating
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between the IRS and the other agency might be difficult.
Nevertheless, given the enormous costs of implementing food
stamps as is, such a change may be beneficial even if it is expensive.
In sum, if the FSP were to be integrated into the tax
system, cashing out food stamps would be the easiest course.
The tax system could much more easily provide cash benefits
than in-kind benefits, because it specializes in measuring
income and collecting or disbursing cash. Cashing out food stamps
would probably not reduce the nutritional benefits of the program
and would reduce or eliminate enforcement of its in-kind limits.
If the purposes of the FSP cannot be served by cashing out
the program, integration may still make sense through a
hybrid-type system, but it would have many fewer benefits.
4. Measurement Periods and Responsiveness
Responsiveness is by far the most difficult problem with
integrating the FSP with the tax system, and we think that it
explains why food stamps are not, and perhaps should not
be, integrated into the tax system. The problem is that food
stamps are provided on a monthly basis and eligibility is
determined on a similar time scale, while the tax system
operates on a yearly accounting period. Alstott describes this
difference as a tradeoff between responding immediately to
short-term changes in need and waiting to evaluate the
permanency of the changes. Welfare systems such as the FSP
tend to respond to short-term changes, acting in some ways
as insurance, while the tax system tends to try to measure
longer-term changes in well-being.
Responsiveness can be very important to a welfare
system. If an individual or family has a short-term but severe
drop in income, they can lose housing, go hungry, or
otherwise go without basic needs. The effects can be large
even if the drop in income is only short-term. In theory, if
the drop is only short-term, capital markets (and insurance)
could help smooth consumption, but in practice, capital and
insurance markets are highly imperfect. Moreover, if the
immediate crisis turns out to be a permanent change, capital
markets may not be able to help even if responding immediately
to the permanent change is vital. Responsiveness is an important
function for welfare systems.
The tax system does not value fast responses to changes
in well-being. The tax system redistributes income from the
wealthy to the poor, thereby increasing the welfare of the
poor. In this sense, it is complementary to welfare systems.
But the tax system does not generally attempt to provide
emergency assistance. Instead, as Alstott notes, the tax system
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tries to measure permanency of changes in well-being. In
fact, the one-year accounting period is arguably too short to
measure long-term well-being, and scholars have proposed
averaging systems that remedy this shortfall.
Integrating food stamps into the tax system, therefore,
might mean that it would not be responsive to short-term
needs, seriously undermining its performance. In the language of
specialization, the FSP specializes in measuring short periods
while the tax system specializes in long periods. Integrating
the FSP into the tax system would mean losing the benefit of
specialized FSP measurements. To understand this problem,
we explore three issues. First, we try to assess how important
a role responsiveness plays in the FSP. We would like to know
whether reducing the responsiveness of the FSP would be a
significant problem by itself. Second, we would like to know
whether there are good substitutes for the short-term needs
fulfilled by food stamps, so that there need be few social
losses if the FSP no longer serves this role. Third, we would
like to understand how responsive the FSP could be if it were
integrated into the tax system.
a. Emergency Responsiveness Appears To Be
Moderately Important to the FSP but Not Central
Responsiveness is built into the design of the FSP. The law
provides that households are entitled to apply for food
stamps on the first day they contact a food stamp office
during business hours. States must provide eligible applicants
with food stamps as soon as possible, but no later than
thirty calendar days following the date the application was
filed. In addition, households that have very little income or
liquid resources can apply for expedited food stamps. If
eligible, an applicant must receive them no later than seven
days after the date of application.
There have been lawsuits about whether states are meeting
these requirements. These suits may merely represent
transfers-individuals might sue to speed up the process
because sooner is better. But they may also represent real
need created by delays in processing. For example, scholars
have found that about two-thirds of all people entering the
FSP have experienced a twenty percent drop in income in the
prior four months. In reality, the suits probably represent
some balance between these two motivations, and indicate
that a significant concern in program design is to get food
stamps to needy individuals quickly.
Another indicator of the importance of responsiveness is
the duration of spells in the FSP. If individuals or families
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generally have short spells, it would indicate that the system
must be responsive-the system would be helping with
short-term needs and failing to be responsive would defeat
that purpose. If, on the other hand, spells are long, the tax
system might be able to help because the program would be
responding to more permanent changes in well-being.
The data on spells are mixed. Philip Gleason, Peter
Schochet, and Robert Moffitt have done the most extensive
study of food stamp spells. They examine two samples-one
comprised of people who begin a spell of FSP participation
during a given calendar period ("entrants"), and the other
comprised of all food stamp participants at a given point in
time, regardless of when they began receiving food stamps
("cross-sectional"). They report that most entrants exit fairly
quickly, with a median participation period of about nine
months. Furthermore, fewer than one-third of entrants
remain on food stamps for two or more years. Nevertheless,
the cross-sectional sample shows that at any given time,
individuals on food stamps are likely to have long spells.
These two samples may lead to the conclusion that a certain
group of FSP recipients goes on and off the program repeatedly.
Indeed, they estimate that two-thirds of all FSP entrants are
repeat entrants, and that many reenter rather quickly after
they have exited the program. Accordingly, if short food
stamp spells by individuals who go on and off food stamps
are aggregated, the vast majority of spells are relatively long-term.
An earlier study by Rebecca Blank and Patricia Ruggles
shows similar findings. It reports that much food stamp
participation among women occurs during long spells of
eligibility. While there are a relatively large number of short
eligibility spells for food stamps, most of these spells open
and close without program participation. In essence, Blank
and Ruggles find that there are two groups of women among
those eligible for food stamps: "A relatively disadvantaged
group with low future income expectations who enroll in
public assistance immediately, and another less disadvantaged
group who (largely correctly) predict future income increases
and who do not seek benefits." This suggests that food
stamps serve longer-term needs that might be served by the
tax system.
One might be tempted to conclude from this data that
responsiveness is not important to food stamps. But Blank
and Ruggles report that those who take up food stamps do so
almost immediately upon eligibility. The tax system, even if
able to handle these individuals' long-term needs, might not
be able to respond quickly when the individuals first become
needy.If the primary concern is quick responses to long-term
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needs, we must understand the immediate cause of the problem
and the type of population it effects. For example, it is
important to know the source of the 20% reduction in
income that often triggers a food stamp application. Only
27% of food stamp participants earn their income through
wages; the rest have other sources of income, such as SSI
(31.7%), TANF (25.8%), and Social Security (25.5%). If,
for example, the reduction in income is mainly due to
decreases in earned income, an increase in the size or length
of unemployment insurance may be the appropriate short-term
response. The little evidence we have found suggests that
though only 27% of FSP participants earn income, a decrease
in earned income is the most probable trigger for entry.
In addition, retaining the entire food stamp program to
solve the immediate needs of a small portion of the population on
food stamps may not be desirable. The USDA reports that of
7335 surveyed households receiving food stamps in 2000,
401 were entrants. This means that responsiveness during the
year is important only to about 5.5% of beneficiaries. In
addition, in fiscal year 2000, only 6.2% of food stamp recipients
used the expedited food stamps option, and about 30% of
them were new entrants. We may be better off responding to
these emergencies in a different way if the benefits from integrating
food stamps with the tax system are otherwise large.
In sum, we would like to have more data before
claiming that responsiveness is central to food stamps. For
example, we would like further study of the length of food
stamp participation spells. Additionally, we would like to
understand better the reasons households go on food stamps,
and what resources they have that could help them to
respond to short-term need.
b. Other Programs,as Currently Constituted,
Could Not Adequately Replace Food Stamps
There is a large system in the United States designed to
respond to short-term dire food needs known as the
Emergency Food Assistance System (EFAS). The EFAS
consists largely of food kitchens and food pantries (and their
wholesale suppliers). Individuals in need can obtain food
from either of these sources. The EFAS, however, is only
about one-fifth of the size of the FSP and is not as well-targeted.
Moreover, the EFAS is not equipped to handle mid-term
problems-the individual who needs more than a few nights
of assistance but less than several years-which the FSP
handles well. The EFAS could be expanded and modified to
some extent were food stamps integrated into the tax system,
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but this would effectively mean less than full integration
because some of the functions of food stamps would be
transferred to the emergency food programs.
There might be non-food-related responses to short-term
need. If, as suggested earlier, cashing out the program would
not present serious difficulties, responsiveness needs might be
met through quick cash assistance rather than through quick
food assistance. Determining that responsiveness is essential to
the FSP would then mean determining whether existing cash
programs (combined with the EFAS) could meet these needs.
c. The Tax System Could Not Easily Be
Made Responsive to Short-Term Food Needs
We can divide tax system responsiveness into two pieces: the
measurement period and the period in which benefits are
provided. These can vary. For example, benefits can be
provided every month even if eligibility measurements are
made only once a year.
The tax system probably could not provide short
measurement periods. As noted, it is important for the tax
system to use long measurement periods. Reducing the
measurement periods in the tax system to allow integration
of the FSP and other transfer programs would impose costs
on everyone, because shorter periods would require more
frequent filings. This could be prohibitively costly.
It is not clear how important short measurement periods
are. Short measurement periods, even if otherwise desirable,
increase administrative and compliance costs. To the extent
short measurement periods increase compliance costs, they
reduce participation in the program. Thus, short measurement
periods may increase responsiveness for some at the cost of
completely eliminating benefits for others.
In fact, because of the difficulties of balancing
responsiveness and long-term measurement periods, and
because of its low participation rate (due to the high
administrative costs of short measurement periods), the FSP
has been moving toward longer measurement periods.
Currently, the frequency of measurement varies across states
and can be quarterly, semiannual, annual, or in some cases
biannual. Thus, shifting to annual measurement for food
stamps would be consistent with the trend of the program.
Monthly provision of benefits is a more difficult problem. It
is not inconceivable that the tax system could provide
monthly benefits. The EITC is currently available on this
basis under the "advance EITC." The EITC program,
however, has a natural intermediary between the IRS and the
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needy individual: the employer. The individual certifies to
her employer that she expects to be eligible for the EITC and
receives installment payments of the credit each pay period.
The employer advances finds to the individual and receives a
credit on its tax return, effectively acting as a financial intermediary.
The FSP, however, has no similar intermediary because
individuals need not be employed to receive food stamps.
Conceivably banks or other financial institutions could fulfill
this role, but this would probably require significant
monitoring, potentially defeating the benefits of integration.
Moreover, the advance EITC, even though easier to
imagine than an advance food credit type system, has not
worked. The take-up rates for the advance EITC are extremely
low. Only 1.1% of EITC recipients used the advance
payment option in 1998. We suspect that a similar system for
food stamps would be even less successful.
d. Conclusion on Responsiveness
Combining these considerations, we conclude that the tax
system could not be adequately responsive to the needs that
the FSP fulfills. In particular, to the extent that immediate
response is necessary even for individuals with medium-to
long-term needs, the tax system may be inadequate.
Becoming more responsive would sacrifice too many goals of
the tax system, and not becoming more responsive would
sacrifice too many goals of the food stamp program.
Nevertheless, we think the issue should be analyzed
further. The data on the need for quick responses by the FSP
are mixed, and we do not yet know exactly how important
that need is. Moreover, we do not know whether other
elements of the transfer system, if enhanced, could satisfy this
need while allowing us to realize the benefits of integration.
5. Conclusion
There would be many benefits to integrating the FSP into
the tax system. The two programs have strong complementarities. Integrating the FSP into the tax system would allow
the FSP to take advantage of the tax system's specialization in
income measurement, including its filing, computer, and
audit systems. Moreover, integrating the FSP into the tax system
would allow better coordination of the tax system and the
welfare system. A crude measure of accuracy reveals no difference
between the FSP and EITC, even though the former is at least ten
times more expensive to administer (and possibly much
more). Nevertheless, if alleviating short-term hunger is an
important enough goal of the FSP, integration is probably not
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desirable because the tax system is not sufficiently specialized
in solving short-term problems. The loss in accuracy from
integration would outweigh any corresponding benefits.
C The Earned Income Tax Credit
The analysis of the EITC is very similar to the analysis of
food stamps. The main differences are that (1) the EITC is a
cash rather than an in-kind program, so concerns about
providing cash benefits are eliminated, and (2) responsiveness is
less important for the EITC than for food stamps. Therefore,
we conclude, integration of the EITC and the tax system, as
under current law, makes sense.
We need say very little about the benefits of integration
of the EITC with the tax system. As noted, measurements for
income transfer programs will be closely related to measurements
for the tax system, and coordination among income transfer
and tax programs is important.
We also need say little about the problem of the use of
different measurement criteria. Alstott argues that, ideally, a
separate transfer program might use different (more accurate)
measurement criteria than an integrated program would. The
arguments on this issue are essentially the same as they were
in the case of food stamps. Finally, discussion of the tradeoff
between participation and compliance also tracks the
arguments made with respect to food stamps.
The key difference between the EITC and the FSP, in
our view, is the need for responsiveness in each program. We
argued that if responsiveness is important for the FSP,
integrating that program into the tax system would mean a
sufficient sacrifice in responsiveness that integration would
not be desirable. We believe that responsiveness is not as
important for the EITC and, therefore, integration of the
EITC into the tax system makes sense.
The core reason we believe this to be true is that the
EITC is a wage supplement. Individuals are entitled to the
EITC based on their wage income. It provides a supplement
only to the working poor; nonworking individuals are not
eligible. This is in contrast to food stamps, where eligibility
does not depend on employment. The EITC also deviates in
this respect from TANF and other transfer programs, for
which individuals who do not work remain eligible (subject
to incentives in the system to obtain work).
As a wage supplement, the EITC is not designed to be,
and indeed cannot be, responsive to individuals in dire need. It
cannot help individuals who have lost their jobs, who cannot find
work, or otherwise need help immediately. Moreover, as a wage
supplement, it is not designed to be temporary. Low-wage
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workers may remain that way for long periods of time, unlike
(one hopes) those individuals who need emergency assistance.
To this end, the EITC has no time cutoff, unlike TANE
There is also evidence that the EITC functions well as an
annual payment. Several studies indicate that individuals use
the EITC as a form of forced savings and tend to invest the
lump sum payments in ways that they would have been
unlikely to invest monthly payments. For example, Jennifer
Romich and Thomas Weisner find that families are more
likely to purchase durable goods and make large purchases
with the EITC than with other funds. Other studies have
found that the lump sum EITC gives recipients an opportunity
to make desirable changes in economic behavior.
As with food stamps, we would like to have more
information before drawing conclusions about the need for
responsiveness in the program. For example, we have been
unable to find any information about EITC participation
spells comparable to the evidence on food stamp spells.
We also cannot conclude from the fact that the EITC is
nonresponsive now that it would not be more successful if it
were responsive. What we observe may be an artifact of the
fact that the program is integrated into the tax system, and
may have little to do with its ideal structure.
More importantly, the whole notion of responsiveness of
a given program is dependent on other programs. For example,
the EITC might be able to be a nonresponsive wage subsidy
only because other programs like food stamps and TANF are
responsive. The arguments we have made are based on the
existing programs rather than on a theory of which programs
or how many programs should be responsive to short-term
needs. Our conclusion thus remains, to a great extent,
contingent on the broader institutional framework of the
society within which the EITC operates. Nevertheless, given
the basic framework of existing programs, integration of the
EITC makes sense. Other programs can act to reduce
emergency needs, allowing the EITC to be structured as a
less responsive, but more efficient, wage subsidy.
D. Summary and Comments on the Relationship to
Overall Reform
The arguments on integrating the FSP and the EITC into
the tax system depend on specialization and coordination.
There are strong reasons why integration makes sense given
the specialization of the tax system (in measuring and
processing relevant attributes and disbursing funds) and the
benefits of coordination. A first approximation of the accuracy
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and complexity of the FSP and EITC supports this argument.
Nevertheless, some elements of transfer programs could not
easily be implemented by the IRS because it lacks the
required level of expertise-the cost savings from tax system
implementation would not be worth the reduced accuracy. In
particular, the tax system is not designed to be able to
respond quickly to changes in well-being, and some sort of
transfer system is likely necessary to do this. To the extent
food stamps are a necessary component of a quick response
system, integration is not desirable.
More generally, we have tried to show how the integration
decision depends on the tradeoff between coordination and
specialization. Integrating most or all welfare programs into
the tax system, such as through a negative income tax, is
attractive because the tax and transfer systems rely on similar
variables. A single agency can specialize in those variables and
coordinate among the various programs. For example, one
can imagine a broad system of refundable tax credits (or a
negative income tax of another sort) combined with an
emergency welfare system designed to reduce short-term
needs. Such a system might be able to take advantage of the
benefits of tax-based delivery of funds combined with
responsiveness to short-term needs.
There may be problems with integration, however,
because many elements of the transfer system could not be
well-replicated within the tax system without a significant
loss of specialization. For food stamps, the problems lie in the
provision of in-kind benefits and rapid response. Study of
other elements of the transfer system may reveal similar
problems. One problem we can foresee is that the tax system
may not have the expertise to exercise significant discretion
regarding many problems of the transfer system. That is, a
program that requires field agents to make non-income-based
decisions about eligibility may not be ideally suited for
integration. For example, a program might provide housing
benefits for families on the condition that the children make
good faith efforts to attend school. If the decision on whether
the children have met this requirement involves discretion,
integration into the tax system would be a bad idea.
Although the balance in any particular area would
depend on the specific program needs and circumstances,
integration may be worthwhile notwithstanding these
problems. The benefits of specialized measurement and
coordination may be greater than the costs. As noted in the
comparison of the costs of administering food stamps and
the EITC, there may be enormous savings from integration.
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CONCLUSION

Rather than summarize what has already been said, let us
suggest further avenues for research. First, as noted, we would
like to extend the institutional framework to include agency costs
and public choice concerns. The departmentalization framework
gives us some valuable intuitions but many of these
intuitions may change once agency costs and public choice
concerns are incorporated.
We suspect, for example, that agency costs might explain
some of the structure of government better than team
theories of organizations. In particular, tax expenditures tend
to be redundant in the sense that they grant to the IRS
authority to implement a program that is within the expertise of
another agency and often has close substitutes at the other
agency. Team theory rationales cannot easily make sense of
this pattern. An agency cost analysis, however, might. The
idea would be that having multiple agents perform similar
tasks allows Congress or the President to monitor the agents
better and to have the ability to threaten each one with
removal of the program. This might improve performance
notwithstanding the increase in specialization and coordination
costs. Further research is needed in this area.
Second, we would like to see more examples analyzed.
This Article has used the EITC and food stamps as its
primary examples. Transfer systems, however, provide a
natural case for integration, and analysis of other programs
may be more difficult. For example, there are numerous
education, healthcare, and housing subsidies in the current
law, and analysis of these provisions would be useful both for
understanding the merits of the particular provisions and also
for developing intuitions about the tax expenditure problem
more generally. In addition, we would like to understand
better the mechanisms used to coordinate policy in these
areas and also in the private sector.
Third, nothing in this Article's framework limits its
application to taxation. The same analysis might be used,
for example, to determine whether antitrust policy is best
implemented in the Justice Department or the Federal Trade
Commission, or both. Similarly, this mode of analysis might
help to determine whether environmental policy should be
implemented through the Environmental Protection Agency,
the Department of the Interior, the Army Corps of
Engineers, other agencies, or some combination thereof.
Understanding how the analysis applies in these other
settings might help in understanding the tax setting, but
might also yield interesting insights in those areas themselves.
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Finally, the purpose of this paper was to understand the
proper scope of the "tax system." The analysis can go in the
other direction as well. Perhaps some tax collection functions
are best carried out by other agencies. For example, an agency
with specialization in farmers might best collect taxes that are
particular to farmers. Many countries have more than one tax
collection agency, and the analysis presented here might be
helpful in explaining this.
More generally, however, the purpose of the framework
presented in this Article is to prompt us to question-to
reconsider the costs and benefits of our present institutions
and to evaluate whether our present allocations of tasks and
functions across government agencies make sense. One
would hope that in many cases they do; our analysis of the
EITC and the FSP suggest such an outcome. But it is also
possible that, in some cases, they do not. To the extent that
our framework can help to identify successful institutional
structures and ferret out examples of misallocated institutional
functions, it can help the government to make better use of
the public fisc.
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